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The 2N -ary choice tree model accounts for response times and choice probabilities in
multi-alternative preferential choice. It implements pairwise comparison of alternatives
on weighted attributes into an information sampling process which, in turn, results in a
preference process. The model provides expected choice probabilities and response time
distributions in closed form for optional and fixed stopping times. The theoretical back-
ground of the 2N -ary choice tree model is explained in detail with focus on the transition
probabilities that take into account constituents of human preferences such as expecta-
tions, emotions, or socially influenced attention.Then it is shown how the model accounts
for several context-effects observed in human preferential choice like similarity, attraction,
and compromise effects and how long it takes, on average, for the decision. The model is
extended to deal with more than three choice alternatives. A short discussion on how the
2N -ary choice tree model differs from the multi-alternative decision field theory and the
leaky competing accumulator model is provided.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Life is full of decisions: Be it the selection of clothing in the morn-
ing or of menu for lunch, the question which car to buy or if taking
cold medication is necessary. This type of decisions is called pref-
erential choice and has been subject of numerous investigations
within the field of decision theory (Koehler and Harvey, 2007,
for a review). Several effects have been observed when the deci-
sion maker has more than two-choice options (multi-alternative
preferential choice). Hick’s Law (Hick, 1952; Hyman, 1953), orig-
inally defined in the context of stimulus detection paradigms,
postulates a dependency of deliberation time on the number of
alternatives. In particular, it states that a linear increase of the
number of equally attractive alternatives to choose from leads to
a logarithmic increase of the time that passes until the decision is
made. Furthermore, a decision maker who is indifferent between
two-choice alternatives from a given choice set may change the
preference for one or the other alternative when the choice set is
enlarged, i.e., the local context may affect the decision and generate
preference reversals. Similarity effects (Tversky, 1972), attraction
effects (Huber et al., 1982), and compromise effects (Simonson,
1989), for instance, depend on a third alternative that is added to
a choice set of two equally attractive but dissimilar alternatives. If
the third alternative is very similar to one of the others, the two
similar alternatives share their choice frequency and are both cho-
sen less often than the dissimilar one (similarity effect). If the third
alternative is similar to one of the others but slightly inferior, it pro-
motes the similar one and increases its choice frequency compared
to the dissimilar one (attraction effect). If the third alternative is a
compromise between the other two, the decision maker will pre-
fer the compromise to the other alternatives (compromise effect).
Besides those preference reversals that emerge from local context,
there might also be influence from background context (Tversky
and Simonson, 1993) like a reference point outside of the choice
set which – together with the loss-aversion principle (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979) – affects evaluation of the given alternatives.
One challenge for (cognitive) modelers is to think of a model
which predicts decision making behavior for multi-alternative
preferential choice tasks in general but also accounts for all the
aforementioned effects. Another challenge is to formulate the
model such that (expected) response times and choice probabil-
ities can be calculated and the model parameters conveniently
estimated from the observed choice times and choice frequencies.
Decision field theory (DFT, Busemeyer and Townsend, 1992,
1993) and its multi-attribute extension (Diederich, 1997) predict
choice response times and choice probabilities for binary choice
tasks. Both approaches provide closed form solutions to calcu-
late these entities. Since then, several attempts have been made to
extend this kind of models to multi-alternative preferential choice
tasks: multi-alternative DFT (Roe et al., 2001) and the leaky com-
peting accumulator (LCA) model (Usher and McClelland, 2001,
2004) predict choice probabilities for three alternative choice tasks
but cannot account for optional choice times, i.e., the time the deci-
sion maker needs to come to a decision. Both approaches, however,
do account for fixed stopping times, i.e., for an externally deter-
mined time limit. Furthermore, multi-alternative DFT and the
LCA model both account for the similarity, attraction, and com-
promise effects using computer simulations to predict the patterns.
To do so Roe et al. (2001) interpret DFT as a connectionist network
and implement distance-dependent inhibition between the alter-
natives. Usher and McClelland (2001, 2004) add insights from
perceptual choice and neuropsychology to the multi-alternative
DFT and propose for their LCA model direct implementation of
www.frontiersin.org June 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 189 | 1
Wollschläger and Diederich 2N -ary choice tree model
loss-aversion by means of an asymmetric value function and global
inhibition instead of distance-dependent inhibition.
Our 2N -ary choice tree model builds on the previous
approaches and tries to overcome some of their problems. It is
a general model for choice probabilities and response times in
choice between N alternatives with D attributes. As such, it pro-
vides a way to calculate expected response times, response time
distributions, and choice probabilities in closed form by deter-
mining the time course of an information sampling process via a
random walk on a specific tree. It is able to account for similarity,
attraction, and compromise effects which have been most chal-
lenging for previous models. In contrast to previous approaches,
the 2N -ary choice tree model accounts for these effects without
additional mechanisms like inhibition or loss-aversion and is thus
more parsimonious. However, it is possible to implement these
mechanisms if the situation requires it.
First, we describe the structure of the 2N -ary choice tree
and the implementation of the random walk on it in general,
including a discussion of initial values and stopping rules. Then
we define expected choice probabilities and reaction times and
state that these exist and can be calculated in finite time. The
proof of this statement is given later in the paper. It is not
essential for understanding the theory; we provide it rather as
completing the theoretical derivations. Next, we show how to
derive transition probabilities from the given alternatives in a
specific choice set and therewith define the random walk for
that set. A psychological interpretation of their constituents is
given afterward. Finally, we demonstrate the predictive power
of our model by showing several simulations for choice sit-
uations producing the similarity, attraction, and compromise
effect and calculate expected hitting times and choice probabil-
ities. We conclude with a comparison of the 2N -ary choice tree
with its closest competitors, the multi-alternative DFT and the
LCA model.
2. THE 2N -ARY CHOICE TREE MODEL
Making an informed decision usually implies sampling of infor-
mation about the alternatives under consideration. In Psychol-
ogy, information sampling processes (e.g., Townsend and Ashby,
1983; Luce, 1986, for review, LaBerge, 1962; Laming, 1968; Link
and Heath, 1975; Townsend and Ashby, 1983; Luce, 1986; Rat-
cliff and Smith, 2004) have a long tradition and proven to be
an adequate tool for detailed interpretation of decision making
processes, mostly in perception as they provide insight about
accuracy and time course of these processes. Poisson counter
models (e.g., Pike, 1966; Townsend and Ashby, 1983; LaBerge,
1994; Diederich, 1995; Smith and Van Zandt, 2000; Van Zandt
et al., 2000) are a special class of information sampling models
that assume constant amounts of information being sampled at
Poisson distributed points in time. (Multi-alternative) DFT (Buse-
meyer and Townsend, 1993; Roe et al., 2001) and the LCA model
(Usher and McClelland, 2004) make use of information sampling
principles in modeling preferential choice under uncertainty. Both
models assume one counter per alternative and all of these coun-
ters are updated once per fixed time interval until one of them
reaches a threshold. The amounts to update the counters depend
on comparison of the alternatives and on already sampled infor-
mation. In our 2N -ary choice tree model, only one counter per
fixed time interval is updated with a fixed amount, but the prob-
ability for each counter to be updated depends on comparison of
the alternatives and on already sampled information. With regard
to its constituents it is thus based on the same principles as both
DFT and the LCA model. As only one counter is updated per iter-
ation, the next time for a specific counter to be updated depends
on the given probabilities. Hence the technical component of the
2N -ary choice tree model resembles a counter model.
2.1. 2N -ARY CHOICE TREES
In contrast to the aforementioned models, the 2N -ary choice tree
model assigns two counters to each of N alternatives in a given
choice set. One of them samples positive information, i.e., infor-
mation in favor of the respective alternative, the other one samples
negative information, i.e., information against it. Their difference
describes the actual preference state relating to that alternative. As
an example, consider two alternatives A and B. The four counters
are labeled A+, A−, B+, and B− and yield the preference states
Pref(A)=A+−A− for alternative A and Pref(B)=B+−B− for
alternative B. Beginning at a fixed point in time, the model chooses
one counter and increases its state by one whenever a specific time
interval h (e.g., 1 ms) has passed. The length h of the time inter-
val can be chosen arbitrarily with a shorter time interval leading
to more precision in the calculation of expected choice probabil-
ities and choice response times. Due to limitations of recording
devices, experimental data will be discrete as well and it is thus
not necessary to aim for a continuous model. Note that increasing
only one counter state at a time with a fixed amount of evidence
equal to one is equivalent to increasing all counter states at the
same time with an amount of evidence equal to the probability
with which these counters are chosen and which also sum up to
one (see below). Updating counters at discrete points in time cre-
ates a discrete structure of possible combinations of counter states
which can be interpreted as graph or, more precisely, as (b-ary)
tree1.
Definition 1 (b-ary tree): A b-ary tree is a rooted tree T = (V, E, r)
with vertices V, edges E ⊆V ×V and root r ∈V where all vertices
are directed away from r and each internal vertex has b children.
For N choice alternatives, consider a 2N -ary tree T = (V, E, r).
Figure 1 depicts the 4-ary tree for the two-alternative example. The
topmost vertex is the root r with outgoing edges directing to four
vertices that represent the counters A+, A−, B+, and B−. Each of
these vertices has four outgoing edges and thus four children itself,
and so forth. The information sampling process is mapped to this
tree as a walk, i.e., a sequence of edges and vertices, beginning with
the root r that takes one step, i.e., passes from one vertex through
an edge to another vertex, per time interval h. Whenever the walk
reaches a vertex, the counter with the same label is updated by+ 1.
Figure 2 shows an example for a walk on the 4-ary tree where first
counter B+ (information in favor of choice alternative B), then
counter A− (unfavorable information for choosing alternative A)
and then again counter B+ is updated.
1Definitions of graph-related terms not defined here can be found in Korte and
Vygen (2002).
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FIGURE 1 | 4-ary tree for choice between two alternativesA and B. The
root r has four outgoing edges directing to four vertices that represent the
counters A+, A−, B+, and B−. Each of these vertices has four outgoing
edges and thus four children itself, and so forth.
FIGURE 2 | 4-ary tree for choice between two alternativesA and B with
highlighted sample path r→B+→A−→B+→ . . .
Three features of the model are of specific interest: (a) when
and how the walk starts after presentation of choice alternatives
(in an experimental trial), (b) how the walk chooses the next edge
to pass through in each step, and (c) when and how the walk
stops. Without an a priori bias toward any of the choice alter-
natives, we assume that all counter states are set to zero at the
outset of the information sampling process and hence, the process
starts with presentation of the choice alternatives. Biases toward
one or several of the alternatives can be implemented by either
defining initial values unequal to zero for these alternatives or
by independently sampling information for the alternatives from
predefined distributions for some time before the actual informa-
tion sampling process starts (cf. Diederich and Busemeyer, 2006;
Diederich, 2008). For simplicity, we assume no biases here, i.e.,
initial values are set to zero for all alternatives. Note that for the
2N -ary choice tree, initial values are counter states at the root
r. Then the walk moves away from there step by step, choosing
the next edge to pass through by means of so-called transition
probabilities pe, e ∈ E. The transition probabilities are built up of
FIGURE 3 |Transition probabilities for the two-alternative choice
problem with no counter-dependent and random component. p(A+),
p(B)+, p(A)+, and p(B−) sum up to one and are the same for the outgoing
edges of each vertex v ∈V.
the comparison of the alternatives the decision maker considers
and supplemented with a counter-dependent component and a
random component. For each vertex, the transition probabilities
for all outgoing edges sum up to one, so that the walk does not
stay still at any vertex it reaches throughout the information sam-
pling process. We show the structure of the model first; a detailed
description of the transition probabilities is presented in the next
section. For simplicity consider a choice situation with two alterna-
tives A and B; the counter-dependent component and the random
component are set to zero. As shown in Figure 3, transition prob-
abilities are the same for the outgoing edges of each vertex v ∈V,
i.e., p(v ,v(A+)) = p(A+) for each edge (v,v(A+))∈ E leading to a
vertex with label A+, p(v ,v(B+)) = p(B+) for each edge leading to a
vertex with label B+ and so on for the other counters A− and B−.
The probability for walking along a specific path is the product
of transition probabilities of all edges on that path. In our exam-
ple, the probability p for making the first three steps as shown in
Figure 2 is p= p(B+)·p(A−)·p(B+).
The third topic addresses the stopping rule, that is, when the
decision maker stops sampling information and chooses a choice
alternative. A specific stopping rule depends on the preference
states associated with the alternatives, i.e., the differences of their
respective two counters which are compared to certain thresholds
θ. The thresholds can be defined in several ways, their suitabil-
ity depending on the definition of transition probabilities and
initial values. They are (1) one single positive threshold θ+> 0
for all alternatives, (2) one positive and one negative threshold
θ+> 0 and θ−< 0 for all alternatives, (3) a positive threshold θ+i
for each alternative i ∈ {1, . . ., N }, and (4) a positive and a negative
threshold θ+i and θ
−
i for each alternative i ∈ {1, . . ., N }.
Obviously, the simplest setup is a single positive threshold
θ+> 0 for all alternatives, which is hit as soon as the information
sampled in favor of any/one of the alternatives exceeds the infor-
mation against it by θ+ for the first time, i.e., when Pref(i)= θ+
for one alternative i ∈ {1, . . ., N }. Sometimes, however, the proba-
bility for collecting negative information may be greater than the
probability for sampling information in favor of these alternatives
and reaching a positive threshold θ+ is very unlikely. For those
situations it is useful to introduce a second, negative threshold,
θ−< 0, which is hit when negative information of one alternative
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exceeds the positive information of this alternative by −θ−, i.e.,
Pref(i)= θ−. In this case the respective alternative is not chosen
but withdrawn from the choice set and the sampling process con-
tinues with one alternative less as described in the next paragraph.
Note, that in both cases the thresholds are global in the sense that
the same thresholds apply for all choice alternatives. Finally, θ+
(and θ−) may vary from alternative to alternative, yielding one (or
two) thresholds θ+i (and θ
−
i ) for each of N alternatives, i ∈ {1, . . .,
N }. Here the thresholds are local in the sense that each alternative
has its own threshold(s). This is an alternative way to implement
biases when the initial values are zero. That is, biases do not affect
transition probabilities through the counter-dependent compo-
nent and can thus be interpreted as the decision maker’s stable
opinion about the presented alternatives.
Withdrawal of alternatives from a choice set traces back to the
model of elimination by aspects (EBA model, Tversky, 1972).
But whereas elimination is the only means to come to a deci-
sion in the EBA model, the 2N -ary choice tree model like the
multi-alternative DFT (Roe et al., 2001) provides several ways to
reach a decision. An alternative i is chosen either if its preference
state exceeds θ+i or if all other alternatives have been withdrawn
from the choice set or a combination of these two. Figure 4 shows
three examples of walks that lead to the choice of alternative B
from a set of three alternatives A, B, and C with global thresholds
θ+= 2 and θ−=−2. The leftmost walk represents direct choice
of alternative B, the rightmost withdrawal of alternative C and
subsequent choice of option B and the middle walk illustrates
withdrawal of alternative A first and then of option C. Note that
after withdrawal of one alternative, there are two-outgoing edges
less from the respective vertex downward. Transition probabili-
ties change accordingly, i.e., the withdrawn alternative is removed
from the comparison procedure and its counter states no longer
contribute to the counter-dependent component (cf. next section).
This corresponds to an anew started information sampling process
between the remaining alternatives and their previous counter
states as initial values.
For a choice set with N alternatives and given thresholds θ±i this
defines the structure of the 2N -ary choice tree. For each alternative
i ∈ {1, 2, . . ., N } we can thus completely identify the set Vi⊆V of
vertices where alternative i is chosen. Defining Pv:= P{r, v} to be the
unique path from the root r to a vertex v ∈V and given transition
probabilities pe for all edges e ∈ E we can identify the probability
for walking along a path Pv as the product pv = Πe∈Pv pe and
therewith define:
Definition 2 (expected choice probability): The expected proba-
bility for choosing alternative i ∈ {1, 2, . . ., N } is the probability
for reaching the set Vi:
pi =
∑
v∈Vi
∏
e∈Pv
pe . (1)
The length |Pv| of the path Pv from r to v ∈V indicates the
number of steps that the random walk has to take to reach v. Mul-
tiplied by the length h of the time interval, this yields the time it
takes to cover the distance from r to v. Thus Tv= h·|Pv|.
Definition 3 (expected hitting time): The expected time for choos-
ing alternative i ∈ {1, 2, . . ., N } is the sum of expected hitting
FIGURE 4 | 6-Ary tree for choice between three alternativesA, B, and C
with decision thresholds θ+ = 2 and θ− =2 and three-different sample
paths that lead to choice of alternative B.
times for each vertex v ∈Vi weighted by the probability for
reaching v :
E[Ti] = h ·
∑
v∈Vi
|Pv | · pv = h ·
∑
v∈Vi
|Pv | ·
∏
e∈Pv
pe . (2)
The expected choice probabilities and hitting times can be
approximated up to absolute accuracy in finite time. See below
for the formal statement and proof of this property.
2.2. TRANSITION PROBABILITIES
Having defined the skeletal structure of our theory, we can now
proceed to its heart, the transition probabilities. The main com-
ponents are (a) weighted comparison of alternatives, (b) mutual
or global inhibition, (c) decay of already sampled information
over time, and (d) a random part. The transition probabilities
control the information sampling process and thus describe the
development of human preferences in specific choice situations.
Throughout this section we will consider such situations with N
choice alternatives that are evaluated with respect to the same D
attributes. For each alternative, the decision maker is provided
with one non-negative value per attribute, representing an objec-
tive evaluation of that alternative with respect to the attributes.
The N ·D values in total can be stored in a N ×D-matrix L= (lij)
with i= 1, . . ., N and j = 1, . . ., D.
The definition of transition probabilities is based on weighted
integration of results of an attribute-wise comparison of alterna-
tives. To ensure equally significant impact of the weight parame-
ters, preprocessing of the values of the alternatives with respect
to the attributes is necessary and we do so by separately nor-
malizing them to one for each attribute. This yields a new
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matrix M = (mij) = (lij/∑Nk=1 lkj) with i= 1, . . ., N and
j = 1, . . ., D and thus column sum ∑Ni=1 mij = 1 for all
j ∈ {1, . . ., D}.
2.2.1. Comparison of alternatives
At first we focus on one attribute j only. The easiest way to
define transition probabilities is simply to use the entries from the
respective column j of M and assign them to the edges that affil-
iate with the counters for positive information. The counters for
negative information get transition probabilities zero. This cor-
responds to a framework where the alternatives are compared
to an inferior external reference point (e.g., cars A, B, and C
are compared to not having a car at all). Because the values for
each attribute sum up to one already, no further normalization is
needed.
We differentiate between external reference points that are not
part of the choice set and internal reference points that are part of
the choice set and available for the decision maker. For instance,
if someone moves to a new city and has to choose between sev-
eral available apartments, she will probably compare them to her
old apartment which is no longer available in the new city and
thus an example for an external reference point. Or consider
a choice of dessert in a restaurant when the decision maker is
told that the chocolate cake she ordered is no longer available
because someone just had the last piece. An internal reference
point, however, is part of the choice set, actually several or even
all available alternatives can be used as internal reference points at
the same time, possibly in combination with an external reference
point.
Having decided which reference points to use, the alternatives
i ∈ {1, . . ., N } are compared to them. For each alternative i, favor-
able and unfavorable comparisons are handled separately and the
absolute values of their differences are summed up to obtain mea-
sures of evidence for and against alternative i, respectively. This
yields two non-negative values per alternative and thus 2N val-
ues in total that are then normalized to one in order to obtain
probabilities. In the car example where three cars are compared
to not having a car at all, probabilities associated with negative
counters are set to zero as each car is better than, presumably, no
car. Actually, whenever one single reference point is used, at least
half of the probabilities are zero because each alternative is either
favored over the reference point or not and hence there cannot be
evidence for and against one alternative at the same time. How-
ever, our main focus is on situations where each of at least three
alternatives in the choice set is used as internal reference point for
all the other alternatives and thus there are at least two-reference
points.
In this case we obtain a vector
Pj =

p1j
...
pNj
p(N+1)j
...
p(2N )j

=

p+1j
...
p+Nj
p−1j
...
p−Nj

/
N∑
i=1
(
p+ij + p−ij
)
with
p+ij =
∑
k 6=i
(
mij −mkj
) · I (mij > mkj) ,
p−ij =
∑
k 6=i
(
mkj −mij
) · I (mij < mkj)
for k = 1, . . .N and
I(x) =
{
1, if x is true
0, else.
Especially with an external reference point at hand, the actual
choice may lead to a loss of some kind. For instance, in the apart-
ment example above a loss could be a further way to the workplace
or a smaller bathroom. People usually try to avoid losses more
than they seek gains while overrating small losses and gains com-
pared to larger ones (Kahneman and Tversky, 1991; Tversky and
Simonson, 1993). The 2N -ary choice tree model can account for
the loss-aversion principle (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) with
an asymmetric value function (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;
Tversky and Simonson, 1993) by increasing probabilities for sam-
pling negative information compared to probabilities for gathering
positive information.
In their LCA model, Usher and McClelland (2004) use an
asymmetric value function
V (x) =
{
log(1+ x), for x > 0
− [log (1+ |x|)+ log (1+ |x|)2] , for x < 0
and apply it to the relative advantages (x > 0) and disadvantages
(x < 0) of alternatives compared to each other on one dimension.
V (x) is steeper for losses than for gains but flattens for both advan-
tages and disadvantages when they become bigger. This favors
similar pairs of alternatives over dissimilar ones and allows the
LCA model to account for attraction and compromise effects.
Adopting it to our 2N -ary choice tree model this yields an
asymmetric value function
A(x) =

log(1+ x), for favorable comparisons
log(1+ x)
+ log (1+ x)2, for unfavorable comparisons,
which can be applied to the absolute differences from the
comparison process before normalizing them to one:
p+ij =
∑
k 6=i
A
(
mij −mkj
) · I (mij > mkj) ,
p−ij =
∑
k 6=i
A
(
mkj −mij
) · I (mij < mkj) .
The asymmetric value function A(x) is not necessary for expla-
nation of similarity, attraction, or compromise effects in the
2N -ary choice tree model but moderates the strength of the com-
promise effect (see below). In cases where θ+ and θ− have the same
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order of magnitude, application of A(x) leads to faster withdrawal
of alternatives and hence, more decisions are based on withdrawal
of all but one alternative.
In summary, the comparison of alternatives provides us with a
set of 2N transition probabilities for each attribute j ∈ {1, . . ., D}
that form a vector P j. Each of these vectors can be used to model
an information sampling process based on a single attribute. As
the probabilities are derived from comparison of alternatives only,
they remain constant during the whole process.
2.2.2. Weighting of attributes
So far we have only focused on one attribute but choice alter-
natives in real life are most often described by several attributes
and thus require more elaboration. In the following, we consider
choice sets with N alternatives characterized by D≥ 2 attrib-
utes. Especially situations with three alternatives where similarity,
attraction or compromise effects have been observed, require at
least two attributes to distinguish the different alternatives from
each other. Note that it is difficult to construct a choice set with
two equally attractive but different alternatives due to the decision
maker’s individual salience. Diederich (1997) accounts for subjec-
tive salience by defining a Markov process on the attributes giving
probabilities for switching attention from one attribute to the
other. This process can be directly implemented into the transition
probabilities by using a stationary distribution on the attributes.
Each attribute j ∈ {1, . . ., D} is assigned a weight wj that corre-
sponds to the probability for considering this attribute during the
information sampling process. For each alternative i ∈ {1, . . ., N }
weighted positive and negative evidence is added up and normal-
ized to obtain a proper probability distribution (the probabilities
add up to one), that is
P =

p1
...
pN
p(N+1)
...
p(2N )

=

p+1
...
p+N
p−1
...
p−N

/
N∑
i=1
(
p+i + p−i
)
with p+i =
∑D
j=1(p
+
ij · wj) and p−i =
∑D
j=1(p
−
ij · wj) for i ∈
{1, . . ., N }.
The weights account for subjective salience that in turn may
be influenced by several internal and external factors such as per-
sonal preferences, social influences, characteristics of the choice
set, or the experimenter’s instructions. Personal preferences like,
for instance, the preference of time over money or of tastiness to
healthiness may be learned from friends, family, or other people in
our surrounding. They are generally independent from the choice
situation and hence, their impact on the information sampling is
indirect. On the contrary, the choice set itself has a direct influ-
ence on the subjective saliences. For example, the decision maker
may primarily focus on those attributes where alternatives are
very similar to each other, because this information may be crucial
for the choice. Or she concentrates on attributes with somehow
outstanding values. It is therefore important to normalize the val-
ues for each attribute as described before because this guarantees
representation of these effects by the attention weights. People that
are present during the deliberation process like sales people or
immediately prior to it like the experimenter in a laboratory con-
text can also have a direct influence on the saliences by drawing the
decision maker’s attention to a specific attribute. This can be used
to verify influence of attention weights by instructing decision
makers to focus on certain attributes while choosing between dif-
ferent cars, salad dressings, chocolate bars or shoes. Corresponding
experiments are under way.
2.2.3. Noise
In order to account for random fluctuations in the decision
maker’s attention (cf. Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993) which are
independent of the characteristics of the choice alternatives, we
add a constant to each transition probability. This makes every
outgoing edge of a vertex v ∈V available for the next (random)
step because it guarantees non-zero transition probabilities for
all of them. Let N be a vector of length 2N with all entries
equal to 1/2N. Weighting the transition probabilities P from the
weighted comparison of alternatives by (1− ξ) with 0≤ ξ≤ 1
and adding the product ξ · N yields noisy transition probabil-
ities where ξ moderates the strength of the uniformly distributed
noise:
PN = (1− ξ) · P + ξ ·N .
The vector PN of noisy transition probabilities integrates com-
parison of alternatives on all present attributes. Related to the
2N -ary choice tree, this information is global as it is independent
of the local counter states and thus the transition probabilities are
the same for the edges emanating from each vertex.
2.2.4. Leakage
During their development of DFT (Busemeyer and Townsend,
1993) introduce a factor s for serial positioning effects, called
“growth-decay rate.” It produces recency effects for 0< s < 1 and
primacy effects for s < 0. In their multi-alternative version of
DFT (Roe et al., 2001) the reverse (1− s) of this factor reap-
pears as “self-feedback loop” and accounts for the memory of
previous preference states. (1− s)= 1 denotes perfect memory of
the previous state (1− s)= 0 no memory at all. For their sim-
ulations (Roe et al., 2001) use (1− s)= 0.94 or (1− s)= 0.95.
Usher and McClelland (2001, 2004) adopted the idea of the self-
feedback loop, but call it “leakage”λ and – based on findings from
neuroscience – interpret it as “neural decay.”
In order to account for decay of already sampled information
over time, we implement leakageL into our transition probabil-
ities. Leakage obviously depends on already sampled information
and thus we normalize the current states of our 2N counters to
1−λ and for each alternative i ∈ {1, . . ., N } add the result for the
positive (negative) counter of alternative i to the transition proba-
bility associated with the negative (positive) counter for alternative
i weighted by λ. Like this, the overall sum of the transition prob-
abilities remains 1 and only 100·λ% of the sampled information
is actually memorized. The greater λ, the longer it takes until the
process reaches a threshold. Overall, this yields
PN L = (1− λ) · [(1− ξ) · P + ξ ·N ]+ λ ·L .
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2.2.5. Inhibition
To account for the similarity, attraction, and compromise effect,
DFT (Roe et al., 2001) and the LCA model (Usher and McClelland,
2004) both rely on inhibition. Whereas distance-dependent inhi-
bition enables DFT to account for the attraction and compromise
effect, global inhibition produces the similarity effect in the LCA
model. We can implement both types of inhibition into the 2N -ary
choice tree model to explore their impact on the aforementioned
effects. We define weights for all pairs of alternatives by either using
the same weight for all pairs like Usher and McClelland (2004) do
with their “global inhibition” parameter β or different weights like
Roe et al. (2001) do with their distance-dependent weights (i.e.,
higher weights for more similar alternatives). Those weights can be
stored in a symmetric N ×N -matrix with zeros on the diagonal.
Taking into account the basic concept of inhibition, we assume
that the state of the positive counter for each alternative i ∈ {1,
. . ., N } reduces sampling of positive information for all other
alternatives j ∈ {1, . . ., N }− {i}. Because this is equivalent to
increasing sampling of negative information for these alternatives
and vice versa for states of negative counters, we implement inhi-
bition I into our model as follows: Multiplying the symmetric
N ×N -matrix with both the vector of states of positive counters
and negative counters yields two vectors with weighted sums of
counter states. We concatenate them in inverted order and nor-
malize the resulting vector of length 2N to µ before adding it to
the vector of transition probabilities now weighted by (1−λ−µ).
This completes the final definition of transition probabilities
PN LI = (1− λ−µ) · [(1− ξ) · P + ξ ·N ]+ λ ·L +µ ·I .
In a nutshell, the transition probabilities consist of a global part
that is independent from the current counter states of the random
walk and a local part that depends on already sampled informa-
tion. The global parts are weighted sums of comparative values P
and noiseN that remain constant during the whole process. They
are complemented with leakage L and inhibition I which may
change from step to step and hence, are local in the terminology
of the 2N -ary choice tree model.
3. PREDICTIONS OF THE 2N -ARY CHOICE TREE MODEL
To show the predictions of the 2N -ary choice tree model and how
it accounts for similarity, attraction, and compromise effects in
choice settings with three alternatives characterized by two attrib-
utes, we run several simulations. An extension to more alternatives
is straightforward. We will define values lij that range between 0
and 10. As values of choice alternatives are normalized to one on
each dimension before comparison, only the relative amount of
these values is of importance. Unless stated otherwise, we run 1000
trials per simulation with threshold θ= 20, noise factor ξ= 0.01
and leakage factor λ= 0.05, but without inhibition (i.e.,µ= 0).
In order to meet the assumptions of the similarity, attraction,
and compromise effect, we constructed two equally attractive but
dissimilar alternatives A= (9, 1) and B= (1, 9) that are both
evaluated with respect to two attributes. The choice probabili-
ties were 0.52, 0.51, and 0.47 for alternative A and 0.48, 0.49, and
0.53 for option B in three simulations with the above mentioned
parameters and attribute weight 0.5 for both attributes.
To reproduce the similarity effect (Simonson, 1989) we add a
third alternative to the choice set that is equal or similar to either
option A or B, i.e., C = (1, 9), C2= (0.9, 9.1), or C3= (1.1, 8.9). To
prevent a combination of the similarity effect with a slight com-
promise effect (cf. Usher and McClelland, 2004), we will use only
C for demonstration, but the results for options C2 and C3 are
very similar to the ones presented here. The alternatives are put
together in a 3× 2-matrix L, whose columns are normalized to
one, resulting in matrix M :
L =
 9 11 9
1 9
 and M =
 0.818 0.0530.091 0.474
0.091 0.474
 .
M already shows smaller values for alternatives B and C on
the second dimension than for alternative A on dimension one
which characterizes the similarity effect. In the next step, the val-
ues on each dimension are compared to each other, resulting in a
6× 2-matrix that is then multiplied by W =
(
0.4
0.6
)
before being
normalized to one again:
P ′ =

1.4545 0
0 0.4211
0 0.4211
0 0.8421
0.7273 0
0.7273 0
 ·
(
0.4
0.6
)
=

0.5818
0.2526
0.2526
0.5053
0.2909
0.2909
.
and
P =

0.5818
0.2526
0.2526
0.5053
0.2909
0.2909
 /2.1742 =

0.2676
0.1162
0.1162
0.2324
0.1338
0.1338

Finally noise is added to this constant part of the transition
probabilities. In contrast to leakage that depends on the respective
counter states and has to be computed anew for every step, PN
remains constant over time. The only occasion where it changes is
after withdrawal of one alternative from the choice set.
The most interesting parameters in this attempt to model a sim-
ilarity effect are the attribute weights as they control the strength
of the effect. Figure 5 demonstrates this by means of choice prob-
abilities from simulations with different sets of attribute weights
but otherwise unchanged parameters. It starts with W =
(
0.6
0.4
)
and W =
(
0.55
0.45
)
on the left side and gradually changes by 0.05 to
W =
(
0.25
0.75
)
on the right side. The relative frequency of choices
for alternatives A, B, and C including the mean number of steps
leading to these choices can be found in Table 1.
The same mechanisms account for the attraction effect (Huber
et al., 1982) that occurs during choice between two equally attrac-
tive but dissimilar alternatives A and B and a third alternative C
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FIGURE 5 | Choice probabilities for choice between three alternatives
A= (9, 1), B= (1, 9), and C= (1, 9) and different attention weights w 1
and w 2 for the two attributes. The abscissa is labeled with increasing
values of w 2 corresponding to decreasing values of w 1. For w 2 < 0.625 a
similarity effect can be observed.
Table 1 | Relative number of choices and mean response times
(arbitrary unit, in parentheses) for alternativesA= (9, 1), B = (1, 9), and
C = (1, 9) from 1000 simulations with θ=20, ξ=0.01, λ=0.05, µ=0,
and w 2=1−w 1 ranging from 0.4 to 0.75 as indicated in the first row.
w2 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55
A 1 (92.4) 1 (116.4) 0.984 (163.0) 0.841 (205.5)
B 0 (–) 0 (–) 0.009 (596.4) 0.081 (555.6)
C 0 (–) 0 (–) 0.007 (475.4) 0.078 (524.6)
w2 0.6 0.61 0.62 0.63
A 0.591 (316.5) 0.516 (358.3) 0.394 (401.0) 0.29 (383.7)
B 0.208 (554.7) 0.237 (622.1) 0.292 (602.8) 0.363 (666.6)
C 0.201 (568.9) 0.247 (590.1) 0.314 (634.0) 0.347 (666.9)
w2 0.64 0.65 0.7 0.75
A 0.180 (418.9) 0.111 (430.7) 0.001 (124.0) 0 (–)
B 0.404 (685.3) 0.450 (679.4) 0.510 (631.8) 0.494 (658.5)
C 0.416 (689.4) 0.439 (678.6) 0.489 (664.2) 0.506 (666.1)
that is similar to one of these but slightly less attractive. For A= (9,
1), B= (1, 9), and C = (1, 8.5) this yields
L =
 9 11 9
1 8.5
 and M =
 0.818 0.0540.091 0.487
0.091 0.459
 .
As shown in Figure 6, the attraction effect occurs between
W =
(
0.39
0.61
)
and W =
(
0.35
0.65
)
Note that the deviation from
weights w1=w2= 0.5 is due to a higher salience of attribute two
because the values on this attribute differentiate between the alter-
natives. The relative frequency of choices for alternatives A, B, and
C including the mean number of steps leading to these choices can
be found in Table 2.
For the compromise effect (Simonson, 1989), two equally
attractive but dissimilar alternatives A= (9, 1) and B= (1, 9)
FIGURE 6 | Choice probabilities for choice between three alternatives
A= (9, 1), B = (1, 9), and C = (1, 8.5) and different attention weights w 1
and w 2 for the two attributes. The abscissa is labeled with increasing
values of w 2 corresponding to decreasing values of w 1. For
0.61≤w 2 < 0.65 an attraction effect can be observed.
Table 2 | Relative number of choices and mean response times
(arbitrary unit, in parentheses) for alternativesA= (9, 1), B = (1, 9), and
C = (1, 8.5) from 1000 simulations with θ=20, ξ=0.01, λ=0.05, µ=0,
and w 2=1−w 1 ranging from 0.4 to 0.75 as indicated in the first row.
w2 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55
A 1 (93.5) 1 (118.4) 0.987 (168.7) 0.81 (204.7)
B 0 (–) 0 (–) 0.012 (593.3) 0.146 (523.4)
C 0 (–) 0 (–) 0.001 (499.0) 0.044 (601.7)
w2 0.6 0.61 0.62 0.63
A 0.557 (313.1) 0.461 (343.6) 0.384 (391.2) 0.248 (396.5)
B 0.357 (466.2) 0.447 (476.1) 0.513 (473.6) 0.655 (487.3)
C 0.086 (558.7) 0.092 (568.1) 0.103 (569.2) 0.097 (605.3)
w2 0.64 0.65 0.7 0.75
A 0.196 (395.5) 0.101 (342.5) 0.002 (155.5) 0 (–)
B 0.699 (448.9) 0.810 (414.6) 0.932 (237.2) 0.953 (159.5)
C 0.105 (483.7) 0.089 (459.0) 0.066 (243.7) 0.047 (174.6)
compete against a compromise option C = (5, 5). Note that the
defined values for each alternative sum up to ten and thus all
three alternatives objectively are equally attractive provided the
attributes are equally weighted. We get
L =
 9 11 9
5 5
 and M =
 0.6 0.0670.067 0.6
0.333 0.333
 ,
and restricting w1=w2= 0.5 to be equal, this yields
P =

0.4
0.4
0.2667
0.4
0.4
0.2667
 .
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So far, these transition probabilities do not seem to induce any
compromise effect but as the probabilities for sampling negative
information are comparatively high, withdrawal of one alternative
from the choice set frequently occurs in that setting. After with-
drawal of one alternative, comparison of the remaining alternatives
is renewed. In the cases where alternative A or B are withdrawn, the
new probabilities clearly favor the compromise option C, yielding
an overall preference for that alternative:
M−A/−B =
(
0.643 0.167
0.357 0.833
)
, P−A/−B =

0.15
0.35
0.35
0.15
 .
In 1000 trials with decision threshold θ= 20, noise factor
ξ= 0.01, leakage factor λ= 0.05, and no inhibition, alternatives
A and B were chosen 247 (24.7%) and 250 (25%) times, respec-
tively, and option C won 503 (50.3%) decisions. Decreasing θ
to 10 yields choice frequencies of 243 (24.3%) for alternative A,
267 (26.7%) for option B, and 490 (49%) for alternative C. θ= 5
leads to 253 (36.9%) choices with an average step number of 36.9
for alternative A, 269 (26.9%) choices with 38.3 steps on aver-
age for option B, and 478 (47.8%) choices with 43.8 steps on
average for alternative C. Figure 7 shows the response time distri-
bution for alternative A for θ= 5, ξ= 0.01, λ= 0.05, and µ= 0.
The expected response time, i.e., the mean of the distribution is
36.6. The magnitude of the compromise effect can be influenced
by application of an asymmetric value function after comparison
of alternatives.
4. COMPARISONWITH OTHER MODELS
Multi-alternative DFT (Roe et al., 2001) and the LCA model
(Usher and McClelland, 2004) both account for similarity, attrac-
tion, and compromise effects in three-alternative preferential
choice and thus build the theoretical background for the 2N -ary
choice tree model. Nevertheless there are some important dif-
ferences and the first one to set the new model apart from the
previous approaches is the attribute-wise normalization of the
FIGURE 7 | Response time distribution for alternativeA= (9, 1) in the
compromise setup with θ=5, ξ= 0.01, λ=0.05, and µ=0. The expected
response time, i.e., the mean of the distribution is 36.6.
initially provided evaluations of alternatives. This preprocessing
of input values makes them comparable over attributes. Effects
that originate from differing orders of magnitude of the input val-
ues can thus be controlled by influencing the attention weights for
the attributes. The comparison of alternatives on single attributes
is basically the same in all three models but only the LCA model
and the 2N -ary choice tree model allow for external reference
points that are not present in the choice set to influence the result-
ing values. Application of an asymmetric value function allows
the LCA model to implement the loss-aversion principle (Kah-
neman and Tversky, 1979) and addition of a positive constant
avoids negative activations and thus negated inhibition which was
crucial for some of the results of multi-alternative DFT. Both con-
cepts (asymmetric value function and positive constant) can be
implemented into the 2N -ary choice tree model as well but do not
affect its ability to account for the aforementioned effects (except
for the magnitude of the compromise effect). Whereas all three
models use leakage to account for decay of already sampled infor-
mation over time and have a random part that implements noise
in human decision making, inhibition is another crucial difference
between them. In multi-alternative DFT, local inhibition explains
the attraction and compromise effect, the LCA model uses global
inhibition to account for the similarity effect. Both types of inhi-
bition can be implemented in the 2N -ary choice tree model but
are not necessary for explanation of the three effects.
Beside some similarities and dissimilarities between the mod-
els, in particular with respect to some underlying psychological
concepts the 2N -ary choice tree model is the first to provide
expected choice probabilities and response times in closed form
and thus allows for convenient estimation of the model parameters
from the observed choice times and frequencies in experimental
settings. Furthermore, it can be extended to more than three-
choice alternatives in a straightforward way to account for choice
behavior in more complex, and possibly more realistic choice
situations.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The 2N -ary choice tree model provides alternative explanations
for the similarity, attraction, and compromise effect that can be
experimentally tested as suggested before. Especially the manipu-
lation of attention weights is of interest, because it differentiates
the model on hand from former approaches and should allow
to experimentally produce similarity and attraction effects which
has been proven to be difficult in the past. One problem, however,
we are currently encountering is limited machine accuracy which
leads to accumulation of rounding errors during calculation of
expected choice probabilities and response times.
6. FORMAL STATEMENT AND PROOF
We can approximate the expected choice probabilities and hitting
times up to absolute accuracy in finite time. This follows from
Theorem 1:
Theorem 1: Each random walk Yn on the above defined tree
T = (V, E, r) with transition probabilities pe, ends in finite time
with probability one.
Corollary 1: With probability one only finitely many addends in
equations (1) and (2) are unequal zero.
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Considering expected values, i.e., limits of infinite sums, it is
helpful to make use of a concept that allows for propositions about
asymptotic behavior. For each alternative, the difference of the
two counters that are associated with this alternative resemble a
birth-death chain:
Definition 4 (birth-death chain): A sequence of random variables
X 1, X 2, . . . with values in a countable state space S ≡ {0, 1, 2,
. . .}⊆N is called Markov chain, if it satisfies the Markov property
P [Xn+1 = x|X1 = x1, X2 = x2, . . . , Xn = xn]
= P [Xn+1 = x|Xn = xn] .
A Markov chain is called time homogeneous, if P[Xn+ 1= x |
Xn= y]= p(x, y) for all n, i.e., the probability for going from x to y
is independent from n. A birth-death chain is a time homogeneous
Markov chain that does not skip any state. Its transition probabil-
ities p(x, y) are equal to zero for all x, y ∈S with |y − x |> 1. A
non-homogeneous birth-death chain is a birth-death chain that is
not time homogeneous.
Durrett (2010) proves the following theorem for (non-
homogeneous) birth-death chains as special case of Markov
chains:
Theorem 2: Let Xn be a Markov chain and suppose
P
[∪∞m=n+1 {Xm ∈ Bm} |Xn] ≥ δ > 0 on {Xn ∈ An} .
Then P[{Xn ∈An infinitely often}− {Xn ∈Bn infinitely
often}]= 0.
For each alternative i ∈ {1, 2, . . ., N }, the above mentioned dif-
ference of its two counters can be interpreted as non-homogeneous
birth-death chain Xn with absorbing states θ
−
i and θ
+
i and state
spaceS = {θ−i , (θ−i + 1), (θ−i + 2), . . . , (θ+i − 2), (θ+i − 1), θ+i }.
Its transition probabilities are
pn(x , x + 1) = pnx= pni (x),
pn(x , x − 1) = qnx= pnN+i(x),
pn(x , x) = rnx= 1− pnx − qnx ,
 for x ∈ S − {θ−i , θ+i }
and
pnx = qnx = 0,
rnx = 1,
}
for x ∈ {θ−i , θ+i } .
Due to the noise in the transition probabilities, pnx > 0 and
qnx > 0 for all x ∈ S − {θ−i , θ+i }. It follows that the probability
for walking the direct way from x ∈ S − {θ−i , θ+i } to either θ−i
or θ+i is
δx :=
 x∏
y=θ−i +1
q
n+x−y
i (y) +
θ+i −1∏
z=x
pn+z−xi (z)
 > 0
and thus
δ := min
θ−i <x<θ
+
i
δx > 0.
Define Tθ−i
= inf {n : Xn = θ−i }, Tθ+i = inf {n : Xn =
θ+i }, Ti = Tθ−i ∧ Tθ+i , An=S , and Bn = {θ
−
i , θ
+
i }. Then
{Xm ∈Bm} is equivalent to Ti≤m and
P
[∪∞m=n+1 {Xm ∈ Bm} |Xn] = 1 > δ
for Xn ∈Bn. The probability for walking from any x ∈S to either
θ−i or θ
+
i on every possible way is
P
[∪∞m=n+1 {Xm ∈ Bm} |Xn] ≥ δ > 0
and thus fulfills the assumptions of Theorem 2. It follows that
P
[{
Xn ∈ An infinitely often
}− {Xn ∈ Bn infinitely often}] = 0
which is equivalent to
P
[{
Xn ∈ An − Bn finitely often
}] = P [Ti <∞] = 1
and as this is true for every alternative i ∈ {1, 2, . . ., N },P[T,∞]= 1
holds for T :=minT 1, T 2, . . ., TN. This proves Theorem 1.
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